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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEEDING BELOW

In late December,

2002,

Ken Thomson, aged

43,

a small business owner and

resident of Meridian, Idaho, had surgery for a rotator cuff repair. An MRI of the chest
taken for that surgery revealed a small "pericardia!" cyst. This is a cyst inside of the
chest and can be adjacent to the esophagus and the top of the heart. It derives its name
from being next to or attached to the pericardium, the fibrous sac surrounding the heart
and the roots of the main arteries to the heart and lungs. The radiologist concluded it
was a benign pericardia! cyst.

On February

6, 2003,

Dr. Olsen, using robotic

instruments known as Video Assisted Thoracoscopic Surgery, or "VATS", removed the
cyst at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center. Afterwards, Mr. Thomson had a paralyzed
left hemidiaphragm.

Treating physicians at the Mayo Clinic, St. Luke's and the

University of Utah concluded that the phrenic nerve, which must be intact for the
diaphragm to work, had been severed or damaged during surgery. (See Appendix:
Plaintiffs Illustrative Exhibit #41.) Dr. Olsen denied damaging the nerve.
The Complaint alleging medical malpractice against Dr. Olsen was filed July 13,
2005.

The jury trial commenced December

6, 2006.

The jury returned a verdict

finding no breach of the standard of care. The trial court denied Plaintiffs Motion for
New Trial. This appeal followed.

ISSUES UPON APPEAL
1.

Demanding the jurors to rate themselves denies the right to an impartial jury.

2.

Defense witness Dr. Cushman was not disclosed, and his testimony should have
been excluded.

3. Email sent to Dr. Cushman which impeached his testimony should have been
admitted into evidence.
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4. There was no issue regarding consent. Admitting into evidence consent forms
and allowing defense counsel to argue "risks of the surgery" was error.
5. Damage to the phrenic nerve was not a "known complication" of the surgery. The
"known complication" defense should not have been allowed absent a scientific
and medical foundation. Expert testimony regarding "known complication"
should have been barred unless there was established a basis in generally
accepted medical practice or theory.

I.

ASKING THE JURORS TO RATE THEMSELVES ON "SYMPATHY"

Defense attorney Hall asked the jurors to "rate themselves" on the "sympathy
factor". The question posed was: "How do you rate yourself on the sympathy thing, on
a basis of one to ten, where would you fall?"

(See, Augmentation to Reporter's

Transcript - Vair Dire.) Thomson's objection was over-ruled.
This was improper. Jurors should not be mandated to state a position on this
issue; the Court gives the proper jury instruction. Jurors are forced to admit prejudice if
they feel any empathy. As happened, many members of the jury panel stated that they
were sympathetic and voluntarily recused themselves or were challenged by the defense
attorney.

It is common knowledge that jurors have empathetic feelings; they are

human. To suggest that they rate themselves on sympathy is to undercut the juror's fair
effort to put aside sympathy as they are instructed. Asking them to engage in a rating
system before there are any facts in evidence not only preempts the court instruction but
also cements in the jurors' minds that they are somehow biased before the trial even
begins. Normal people are expected to experience sympathy; the question is whether or
not that person will be unduly swayed or whether the jury can decide the case without
bias pursuant to the Court's instructions. Questions that are not intended to actually
discover bias against a law or jury instruction but rather seek to determine how jurors
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would respond to anticipated evidence and commit them to a specific verdict are not
proper. Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 SW.3d 743 (Texas 2006).
This question came before the Connecticut Supreme Court in Lamb v. Burns, 520
A.2d 190 (Connecticut 1987).

The Connecticut Court found that questions regarding

whether an award of money should be given to an injured party simply knowing the
party was injured was proper, as well as questions eliciting knowledge of the law;
however, the Connecticut Court did not question that the trial court had the right to
prohibit questions as to how the jurors would "rate" themselves, quoting the trial court:
"Now obviously it would be very helpful to counsel to know which are the
most sympathetic jurors and ask them to rate themselves on a scale of one
to ten. Then the defendant would put all those who rate themselves below
five for the defendant. The plaintiff would pick all those who rate
themselves higher than ten for sympathy, but that's not what the purpose
of the voir dire is; and that's why the Court will sustain the objection to
those two questions."
In Dickerson v. State, 740 SW.2d 567 (1987), it was held defense counsel could not ask
questions during voir dire if they would place "reasonable doubt" on a percentage or
sliding scale.
Should a trial court permit a plaintiff to ask jurors during voir dire the following:
"On a scale of one to ten, how would you rate yourself on this question of treating a
corporation the same as an individual?" Similarly, if plaintiffs counsel asked, "How do
you rate yourselves on a scale of one to ten on this 'circumstantial evidence' thing?"
Examples of this kind are too numerous to list. The point is obvious. Counsel is
eliciting the jurors to their side, superseding the court's instruction regarding sympathy,
apportionment of liability, treatment of a corporation, etc. The hidden agenda is "take a
biased position before you hear any evidence." Attorneys frequently use a jury rating
scale in determining whom they will challenge for cause. The next step is simply to have
the jurors do the rating themselves, which accomplishes the same thing and is even
more effective; it aligns the jurors with the defendant; it is manifestly unfair.
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II.
ALLOWING DR. AUSTIN CUSHMAN, WHO DISCUSSED THE LOCAL
STANDARD OF CARE WITH PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT. TO TESTIFY EVEN
THOUGH HE HAD NOT BEEN DISCLOSED PRIOR TO TRIAL AS A
WITNESS, WAS ERROR.
The order setting trial and cut-off dates was entered January 6, 2006 (R, Vol.1, p.

15). Trial was set to commence December 6, 2006. Discovery cut-off was set for 60
days prior to trial with defendant's expert witnesses to be disclosed 120 days prior to
trial. A Rule 16(d) pre-trial conference was held November 28, 2006, prior to the start
of trial. The Court's order stated that at pre-trial conference the parties were to discuss
"al1 items as set forth in Rule 16(a) - G), I.R.C.P."
Defendant Olsen filed a final list of trial witnesses on November 17, 2006.
(Affidavit of Schlender; Exhibit A.) At no time prior to commencement of the trial did
Olsen advise the Court or plaintiffs counsel that Austin Cushman, M.D. would be a
witness at trial. On December 8, 2006, at the end of the first week of trial, defense
counsel announced they would cal1 Dr. Cushman as a witness. On December 11, 2006,
the following Monday during plaintiffs case in chief, the defense called Dr. Cushman
out of turn. Objection was stated by plaintiffs counsel; Dr. Cushman had not been
disclosed in a timely manner as per the court's pre-trial order. (TR., Vol. 1, p. 582.) The
Court allowed Dr. Cushman to testify. (TR. Vol. 1, p. 588.) Dr. Cushman testified on
December 13. He acknowledged that Dr. Shuman had a telephone conversation with
him concerning local standards. He denied however that he had told Dr. Shuman that
he had performed chest surgeries or that he knew the local standard of care for thoracic
surgeons performing the type of surgery Dr. Olsen performed on Mr. Thomson: removal
of a pericardia! cyst in the chest. He told the jury he was not qualified to render an
opinion about chest surgery in Boise, Idaho; he did not tell Dr. Shuman the standard of
care for chest surgeons. (TR., Vol. 1, p. 878-882.)
The testimony of Dr. Cushman was devastating to plaintiffs case. He refuted key
elements of Dr. Shuman's expert witness testimony.
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Plaintiff called as their expert witness on the standard of care Robert L. Shuman,
M.D. of Long Beach, California. Dr. Shuman is a thoracic surgeon trained in both
general and cardiac surgery and board certified in cardio-thoracic surgery. (TR., Vol.
p.

2000-2003).

1.,

Dr. Shuman testified that he had discussed the standard of care in

Boise, Idaho for thoracic surgeons in

2003

with Dr. Austin Cushman, whom he

described at trial as "a general and vascular surgeon here in Boise". Dr. Shuman
described his conversation with Dr. Cushman as follows:
"A. Cushman, I guess. Cushman is a general and vascular surgeon here
in Boise. And so I asked him if he was familiar with VATS lung operations
for removal of pericardial cysts; and he said he was.
"I asked him who was doing the surgery in Boise. And he said, at the
time that I called him, that pretty much it was being done by the
cardiovascular thoracic surgeons, but that before they had been here in
significant numbers, he had been doing surgery of that type. He had been
doing more open operations in the chest.
"And so he was familiar with the operation, he was familiar with the
pathology. And I said: If you're operating to remove this cyst "Q. First, before you get there, let me ask you this question, Doctor. Did
you ask him about a specific time and place?
"A. Yes, I did.
"Q. And what time period did you ask him about?
"A. Well, I said the time period that we're talking about is February of
'03. So that's our frame of reference.
"Q. Did he tell you he resided here in Boise, Idaho?
"A. He did, yes.
"Q. Did you make an inquiry as to what area or what locale you needed to
know that about?
"A. I don't think I understand.
"Q. What city, or where were you asking as to the standard of care?
"A. Well, Boise.
"Q. And did he - did you explain to him the type of issues that you had
that you were investigating?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And tell the jury about that.
"A. Well, basically I said if this operating is being done by a trained
physician, and if the phrenic nerve is paralyzed following this operation, is
that a breach of the standard of care in Boise, Idaho (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 222 - 225)
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Defense counsel requested of the Court that plaintiff be required to make an offer
of proof outside the presence of the jury, which was done. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 225 - 237, 1.8).
Under examination by Dr. Olsen's counsel, Dr. Shuman once again stated Dr. Cushman
had told him he was a vascular surgeon and that he had done thoracic surgery in the
past or had assisted with it; Dr. Cushman advised him he had knowledge of the standard
of care for chest surgery to remove a pericardia} cyst as that standard existed in
February of 2003:
"DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)
BY MR. SCHLENDER:
"Q. Dr. Shuman, when you talked with Dr. Austin, did you tell him you
were investigating a specific case?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And did you tell him the time period of that case?
"A. I did.
"Q. And you told him what?
"A. I told him that it revolved around a pericardia] cyst that was done by
a VATS procedure through the left chest and resulted in permanent
damage to the phrenic nerve.
"Q. And when you asked him about that, did he indicate to you that he
had actual knowledge of the standard of care for that period of time?
"A. Yes, he did.
"Q. February of 2003?
"A. Yes.
"Q. He was still actively practicing as a surgeon?
"A. He was actively practicing, and certainly was aware of what goes on at
the hospitals. Many hospitals have M and M, morbidity and mortality
conferences, and complications are presented or they're certainly known
and talked about in the hallway. He was aware of the standard of care,
from what he told me."
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 234 l.13 -235, I. 16)
The Court allowed Dr. Cushman to be called to testify.
"THE COURT: And here is the reason why. What I said was, if Dr.
Cushman now comes in and testifies before this court and then I make a
judgment on whether or not I believe that Dr. Shuman really did hear Dr.
Cushman tell him all these things that he said that he holds him, if Dr.
Cushman's affidavit testimony holds up to that scrutiny and holds up to
cross-examination, I would probably - I think there's a real good
possibility that I might find that Dr. Cushman - at least there is a
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possibility that I would find that Dr. Cushman is telling the truth, and that
means that Dr. Shuman wasn't. Maybe that's what I'll find.
"And I guess what I'm saying is, if Dr. Cushman's testimony from his
affidavit stands up and if that's all they had, I would say no, he hasn't
familiarized himself with the standard of care.
So the affidavit is already in the record. I don't know if you want to
call Dr. Cushman and flesh out the record a little bit more or not, Mr. Hall.
"MR. HALL: And it's two questions: Do I call him and do that with you
and then do we do it in front of the jury, too, to impeach the testimony?
""THE COURT: That's kind of a judgment call. I would allow you to call
Dr. Cushman and testify on that subject if you wanted to do that, simply to
impeach him. And maybe if you're going to call him anyway, you could
just call him in front of the jury and off we go."
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 700 l.7- p. 701 l.14)
Whether or not to allow testimony from a witness not properly disclosed is in the
first instance a matter of discretion for the trial court. Burgess v. Salmon River Canal
Co. 127 Idaho 565, 903 P.2d 730, 738 (1995). To determine whether the trial court
abused its discretion, the Court considers whether it correctly perceived the issue as
discretionary, whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent
with applicable legal standards, and whether it reached its decision by an exercise of
reason. Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho 46, 995 P.2d 816
(2000).
In the instant case, the trial court did not enter a pre-trial conference order which
set a deadline for the disclosure of witnesses per I.R.C.P. 16(b). The parties did not
enter into a pre-trial stipulation pursuant to Rule 16(e), I.R.C.P.

A scheduling

conference pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(b) was held, and an Order was entered on January 6,
2006, setting the trial as well as deadlines for discovery, disclosure of experts and
motions. The Order states on page 3 thereof, paragraph 9, the following:
"9) ATTORNEYS CONFERENCE: Counsel for Plaintiff shall convene an
attorneys conference two weeks prior to final pre-trial
conference for the purposes of exchange and marking of all
exhibits, exchange of all witness lists, the noting of any foundational
objections to exhibits or witnesses, stipulate to uncontested facts, explore
all settlement possibilities, and prepare a pre-trial stipulation pursuant to
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Rule 16(c), I.R.C.P., which stipulation will be presented to this Court at the
final pre-trial conference."
(emphasis added)
Paragraph 12 of the same Order states the following:
12) SANCTIONS: Failure to comply with this Order shall subject a party
or its attorney to appropriate sanctions, including but not limited to, costs
and reasonable attorney fees, the dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiffs
claim, or the striking of a Defendant's defenses. A party may be
excused from strict compliance with any provisions of this
Order only upon motion showing extraordinary circumstances.
(Emphasis added)
The Court did not leave it to the parties to disclose witnesses whenever they
wanted to; witnesses were to be disclosed not later than two weeks prior to the final pretrial conference which was held November 28, 2006. Thomson's counsel pointed out to
the Court that Dr. Cushman was not disclosed:
"MR. SCHLENDER: Yes, Your Honor. If it please the court, as per this
court's pretrial order, November 14th , 2006, was the last date as per your
pretrial order to disclose all witnesses, not just Rule 16 but your order said
all witnesses.
"The deposition of Dr. Shuman had been taken, and the conversation
between - or the revelation or discussion between Mr. Hall and Dr.
Shuman as to Dr. Cushman took place of November 2, 2006. So almost
two weeks had expired from then to when they were to name all the
witnesses pas per this court's order.
"The proposed witness list was delivered to us on or about November
- we have 11h, but I'm not quibbling that it's late. Because we were all
agreeing to do certain things out of turn.
"But in any event, in this Dr. Cushman's name is not listed. He is not
listed at all as a witness.
"THE COURT: Well, he is a rebuttal witness, though. Right?
"MR. SCHLENDER: That is exactly, if he is going to be anything, is
absolutely correct. And as the court ruled in Perry v. Magic Regional, I'll
be short. I know the court has got a jury out there. Give this some
thought, please. I'd respect it, Your Honor.
"Perry v. Magic Regional is an almost identical situation in that
they said we have an impeachment person, somebody that can impeach
something that happened in plaintiffs case and we haven't revealed it until
now and we want to do this.
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"And Judge Meehl trying the case said sorry. What you really are
doing is rebuttal, and you should have made that portion of your case and
revealed that person as a rebuttal witness, not called an impeachment
because you knew in advance that this would come up, such as here they
knew about Cushman.
"The Idaho Supreme Court sustained that and said that was the
correct ruling, that they couldn't hide behind the guise and say well, now
we have a rebuttal witness, when they knew they should have listed him.
That would have given us an opportunity to do our investigation of Dr.
Shuman to do whatever we needed to properly cross-examine him. We
have not had that opportunity.
"THE COURT: I see. Well, would you like to be heard on this, Ms. Duke
or Mr. Hall? Mr. Hall, go ahead.
"MR. HALL: Yes, Your Honor. I think the court is well aware of how this
developed, and the way it really developed was a function of Dr. Shuman
saying something on the witness stand that went beyond what he had said
in his deposition.
"THE COURT: That's true.
"MR. HALL: And that is the event that has necessitated our needing to
call him.
We in our disclosures of witnesses said that Dr. Olsen further
reserves the right to call any person identified by the plaintiff as a witness
or a person with knowledge, either fact or expert, whether they are
identified by way of a pleading, letter, discovery, deposition testimony, or
otherwise, during the course of this litigation to discuss any matter for
which they are competent to testify, including any matter within the scope
of their expertise based upon their training, education, and/ or experience
and further reserve the right to offer as testimony by deposition the
deposition testimony of any individuals who have been deposed in this
matter.
That is all a function of what transpired in this courtroom.
"THE COURT: Right.
"MR. HALL: And what Dr. Shuman said about Dr. Cushman. So we're
bringing in Dr. Cushman as a result of that.
"THE COURT: I'm going to allow it....
"Dr. Shuman specifically testified as to what Dr. Cushman told him in
that telephone conversation.
"The court then received the affidavit of Austin R. Cushman, M.D.,
faxed to the court or presented to the court I believe on Friday morning,
this last Friday morning, and said that this affidavit said what it said, and
that's part of the record. It says look, I'm the Dr. Cushman that Dr.
Shuman says he talked to about this stuff and I never told him that I
assisted in these surgeries or performed this type of surgery, for example.
"So I said well, it's not for the court to say I hereby declare that Dr.
Cushman is telling the truth and Dr. Shuman was telling a lie. I think
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that's up to the trier of fact. And at that time I said I would allow Dr.
Cushman to be called as a witness to rebut the testimony and
impeach the testimony of Dr. Shuman. It could not be done by
affidavit because Dr. Cushman should be available to be cross-examined
by plaintiffs counsel.
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 582, L.10 - p. 588, L.17)(emphasis added)
The trial court acknowledged that Dr. Cushman was being called to both rebut and
impeach Dr. Shuman's testimony, apparently based on what counsel characterized as
"Dr. Shuman saying something on the witness stand that went beyond what he had said
in his deposition." (Tr. Vol.1, p.584, L 13-19).
This is disingenuous. At the deposition of Dr. Shuman on November 3, 2006,
Dr. Cushman was identified by Dr. Shuman as the doctor with whom he spoke in Boise
regarding the local standard of care applicable to the defendant; that Dr. Cushman had
told him he had assisted in this type of surgery at prior times and that injury to the
phrenic nerve during such surgery fell beneath the standard of care.

(Shuman

deposition, pp. 30-31.) Defense counsel knew a month prior to trial exactly who the
local physician was upon whom Dr. Shuman relied to establish the applicable standard
of care for this surgery: Dr. Austin Cushman. That knowledge was gained by defense
counsel two weeks prior to the date for filing of a final list of witnesses.
The non-disclosure of Dr. Cushman as a defense key witness was extremely
prejudicial, considering the plaintiff had every reason to believe that Dr. Cushman had
reviewed the medical files of Mr. Thomson and truthfully told plaintiffs expert Dr.
Shuman that he was knowledgeable as to the local standard of care in Boise, Idaho for
this particular surgery. The medical records had been sent to his office as attachments
to an email; it was affirmed by his secretary at trial that they had been received and
delivered to Dr. Cushman, although key portions of the emails were improperly kept
from the jury. This subject is covered in more detail in another portion of this brief.
Had plaintiff known that Dr. Cushman was going to be called as a witness for the
defense and that he would refute Dr. Shuman's testimony and tell the jury he did not
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know the local standard of care, had not ever performed this type of surgery or even
assisted in it, plaintiff could easily have had Dr. Shuman consult with another surgeon
in Boise, Idaho and make certain this type of recantation would not irretrievably
damage Mr. Thomson's case.
Thomson relied upon there being no surprise witness in this case, especially Dr.
Cushman. Dr. Cushman had been sent the medical records, had agreed to discuss the
standard of care with Dr. Shuman, and did so by telephone prior to commencement of
the jury trial, none of which was known to the jury.
The early Idaho statute on impeachment, C.S. §8036 read: "The party producing
a witness is not to impeach his credit by evidence of bad character, but he may
contradict him by other evidence and may also show that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony." The theories under which evidence
is considered impeaching and to be admitted is when a party is surprised at the
unfavorable testimony given by a witness called by himself, the witness is hostile, or the
party calling that witness has been entrapped to his prejudice. Bodenhamr v. Pacific
Fruit and Produce Co., 259 Pac. 243, 50 Idaho 248 (Idaho 1931). Evidence which is
purely and truly evidence to impeach a witness is that which contains statements by a
witness inconsistent with their testimony at trial. Pierce v. J.C. Penney Co., 167 Cal.
Apps. 2nd 3; 334 P.2d 117, quoted in Gem Valley Ranches, Inc., v. Small, 411 P.2d 943,
90 Idaho 354 (Idaho 1966). It has been stated that witnesses can only be impeached by
proof of contradictory statements of a material fact. State v. Jones, 62 Idaho 552, 113
P.2d 1106 (1941). Testimony by one witness that another witness was or was not telling
the truth when they made a particular statement is not admissible evidence. State v.
Radebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 864 P.2d 596 (1993). The present Rules of Evidence, and
specifically Rule 607 and Rule 608 do not expand the nature of what constitutes
impeachment versus rebuttal evidence. However, when the identity of a witness is
tardily disclosed, the trial judge should request an explanation of the late disclosure,
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weigh the importance of the testimony in question, determine the time needed for
preparation to meet the testimony, and consider the possibility of a continuance.
Wiseman v. Schaffer, 115 Idaho 537, 768 P.2d 800 (Ct.App. 1989). The Court did none

of this. There was no good cause shown for not advising Mr. Thomson's counsel that Dr.
Cushman was going to be called as a witness; the Court should have excluded Dr.
Cushman. Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho 46, 995 P.2d 816
(2000).

Evidence that repels, counteracts or disproves evidence given by a particular

witness is properly "rebuttal". State v. Mundell, 158 P.2d 799, 66 Idaho 339 (Idaho
1945). Since the adoption of Idaho Rules, the distinction between impeachment and
rebuttal witnesses has been somewhat blurred in that Rules of Evidence 607 and 608
addressing witnesses do not differentiate between impeachment versus rebuttal
witnesses. However, the intent of the Rules as well as the rules of discovery is to prevent
trial by ambush. If a party knows of a material witness whom it will call at trial, the
opposing party is entitled to know that witness and the proposed testimony prior to the
commencement of the trial so as not to be surprised and prejudiced. Olsen will argue
that since Dr. Shuman's testimony was not entirely struck by the Court, there was no
prejudice. That can hardly be the case, considering that Dr. Shuman was the only
witness addressing the standard of care; he was Thomson's only medical expert.
As explained in the next section, the prejudice and error were compounded by the
court keeping from the jury a key part of an email sent to Dr. Cushman's office. Added
together, the rulings deeply prejudiced Thomson's case.

III. DOCUMENTS OFFERED TO REBUT AND IMPEACH THE
TESTIMONY OF DR. AUSTIN CUSHMAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED
INTO EVIDENCE.
Prior to the date Dr. Shuman telephoned Dr. Cushman, Thomson's counsel sent

to Dr. Cushman's office the medical records and reports of Mr. Thomson; there would
be no question when Dr. Shuman talked to Dr. Cushman that they were talking about
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the standard of care for the exact surgery in question.

As previously stated, Dr.

Cushman insisted that he knew nothing about the surgery in this case, had never done
it, and could not have told Dr. Shuman the applicable standard of care for Dr. Olsen.
Plaintiffs Exhibit #85 was an email to Dr. Shuman's office with attached medical
reports including the operative report, the Mayo Clinic Reports, and the CV of Dr.
Shuman. The affidavit of Barbara Forrest that authenticated this email (Plaintiffs
Exhibit #84) should have been admitted into evidence. See, In the Interest of F.P., -A.2d --, 2005 WL 1399264 (Pa.Super., June 15, 2005).
The standard for authenticating computer records is the same as for
authenticating other records.

The degree of authentication does not vary simply

because a record happens to be (or has been at one point) in electronic form. See United
States v. DeGeorgia, 420 F.2d 889, 893 n.11 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Vela, 673

F.2d 86, 90 (5th Cir.1982). But see United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1125 (8 th Cir.
1977) (stating in dicta that "the complex nature of computer storage calls for a more
comprehensive foundation"). For example, witnesses who testify to the authenticity of
computer records need not have special qualifications. The witness does not need to
have programmed the computer himself, or even need to understand the maintenance
and technical operation of the computer. See United States v. Moore, 923 F.2d 910, 915
(1st Cir. 1991) (citing cases). Instead, the witness simply must have first-hand knowledge
of the relevant facts to which he or she testifies.

See generally United States v.

Whitaker, 127 F.3d 595, 601 (1h Cir. 1997) (FBI agent who was present when the

defendant's computer was seized can authenticate seized files); United States v. Miller,
771 F.2d 1219, 1237 (9th Cir. 1985) (telephone company billing supervisor can
authenticate phone company records; Moore, 923 F.2d at 915 (head of bank's consumer
loan department can authenticate computerized loan data.)
Courts generally permit computer-stored records to be admitted as business
records according to Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 923 F.2d
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910, 914 (1st Cir. 1991; United States v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1988) . Other
circuits have articulated doctrinal tests specifically for computer records that largely
(but not exactly) track the requirements of Rule 803(6). See, e.g., United States v.

Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904, 909-10 (10 th Cir. 1994) ("Computer business records are
admissible if (1) they are kept pursuant to a routine procedure designed to assure their
accuracy; (2) they are created for motives that tend to assure accuracy (e.g., not
including those prepared for litigation); and (3) they are not themselves accumulations
of hearsay.") (quoting Capital Marine Supply v. M/V Roland Thomas II, 719 F.2d 104,
106 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1494 (1h Cir. 1990)
(computer-stored records are admissible business records if they "are kept in the course
of regularly conducted business activity, and [that it] was the regular practice of that
business activity to make records, as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness.") (quoting United States v. Chappell, 698 F.2d 308, 311 (7h Cir.
1983)). Notably, the printout itself may be produced in anticipation of litigation without
running afoul of the business records exception. The requirement that the record be
kept "in the course of a regularly conducted business activity" refers to the underlying
data, not the actual printout of that data. See United States v. Sanders, 749 F.2d 195,
190 (5th Cir. 1984). Also see, Sea-Land Serv, Inc v Lozen International, LLC, 285 F.3d
808, 821 (9th Cir. 2002).
The excluded exhibit is attached to this Brief and reads as follows:
Bonnie:
I have attached the Operative Report, the Mayo Clinic Report and the
C. V. of Dr. Shuman.
Dr. Cushman would potentially talk by telephone with Dr. Shuman
regarding the surgical case; Dr. Cushman will not be an expert for any side
and will not be called to testify.
Dr. Shuman simply needs to talk with Dr. Cushman and see what he
thinks of the phrenic nerve compromise that caused the paralyzed
diaghram[sic] in this unfortunate fellow.
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I will forward to you any required retainer or you can bill me after they
talk; whatever you prefer.
If Dr. Cushman can do this, I will have Dr. Shuman give him a call;
probably in the next couple of weeks.
You can just email me back.
Many Thanks!
Lee
(Plaintiffs Proffered Exhibit #85, not admitted)
This email was received by Dr. Cushman's office on November

1, 2005.

It

confirms that Dr. Shuman would be talking to Dr. Cushman "about the surgical case";
that the discussion would include talking with Dr. Cushman to "see what he thinks of
the phrenic nerve compromise that caused the paralyzed diaphragm in this unfortunate
fellow". More simply stated, Dr. Shuman's telephone call would not have been simply a
"cold call". It refuted Dr. Cushman's testimony; Dr. Cushman had indeed discussed
with Dr. Shuman this particular case and the standards involving phrenic nerve
compromise causing a paralyzed diaphragm. When cross-examined by Mr. Schlender,
Dr. Cushman told the jury the following:
"Q.
Now, certainly at that time, your testimony here is today that you
were not aware of the phone call involving pericardial cysts; is that right?
"A.
I don't know about that, no.
"Q. And you told the jury you don't recall. He didn't ask you about it.
There was no mention of anything about pericardial cysts. Right?
"A.
That's right.
"Q.
And there was no mention anything about the phrenic nerve.
Right?
"A.
That's right.
"Q.
And you hadn't reviewed any records of this particular case, nor had
you reviewed a CV of Dr. Shuman had you?
"A.
No.
"Q.
And you had not seen any records from the Mayo Clinic before you
talked to Dr. Shuman either, had you?
"A.
No.
MR. SCHLENDER: Your Honor, I offer into evidence, as per the citations
I give you - and if necessary I can call his secretary who we subpoenaed
and who is outside - the affidavit with the attachments.
THE COURT: Well, I haven't had an opportunity to review this. Has
counsel had an opportunity to review this affidavit?
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MR. HALL: No, Your Honor. It was just handed to me.
THE COURT: You want the affidavit into evidence?
MR. SCHLENDER: I want the affidavit and the attachments to it in
evidence, or alternatively the documents which are attached through
(TR. Vol. I, p. 884, L. 14 - p. 885, L. 24)
Exhibit A and Exhibit B.
The Court first indicated that Exhibit 85, the email describing what Dr. Cushman had
been sent to review, which included the operative report describing the pericardia} cyst
surgery, would be allowed and admitted into evidence. (TR. Vol. I, p 893 L. 1 -17.)
Prior to calling to the stand the secretary to whom the critical Exhibit 85 email
was sent, counsel asked Dr. Cushman the following:
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: Dr. Cushman, do you have a Bonnie Lee who
works in your office?
"A.
I do.
"Q.
Is your E-mail address cableone.net?
"A.
"Q.
"A.
"Q.

Yes.

Is Bonnie Lee a nurse or someone else in your office?
Yes.

How long has she been with you?
Twelve years.
"Q.
And would you rely upon her to transmit to you or give to you
anything that needs to come to your attention?
"A.
Yes.
"Q.
And you would not anticipate that she would ever try to hide or
conceal anything from you?
"A.
No.
"Q.
In your experience with Bonnie Lee, has she always been truthful?
"A.
Yes.
"Q.
And we could rely upon her to be able to tell us truthfully about
anything you knew about this case. Correct?
"A.
Yes.
"Q.
And as I understand your testimony, you were not given you did not receive, nor did you review the Thomson operative
report before your testimony today; is that right?
"A. That's right.
(TR., Vol. I., p. 894, L.25 - p. 897 L. 15.)
"A.

Bonnie Lee, secretary to Dr. Cushman, was then called to testify about the email
and the documentation which Dr. Cushman denied having reviewed.
counsel laid a foundation for admission of the email:
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Thomson's

"DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SCHLENDER:
"Q.
Could you state your name please.
"A.
Bonnie J. Lee, L-e-e.
"Q.
And where are you employed?
"A.
Dr. Austin Cushman.
"Q.
And were you employed by Dr. Cushman in November 1 of 2005?
"A.
Yes.
"Q.
And are you an RN?
"A.
No.
"Q.
You're a "A.
I'm a CNA, nursing assistant.
"Q.
CNA?
"A.
Yes.
"Q.
In your duties at Dr. Cushman's, do you have an E-mail address?
"A.
Yes.
"Q. And is your E-mail address BonnieL@cableone.net?
HA.
Yes.
"Q.
Still is?
(~A.
Yes.
"Q.
Do you have any independent recollection, without any paper being
put before you, of receiving E-mail from my office?
"A.
No.
"Q.
And do you have any independent recollection of having documents
sent to your office from me, attached to an E-mail?
"A.
No.
MR. SCHLENDER: May the witness be handed Plaintiffs marked Exhibit
#85?
(Document handed to the witness.)
"Q.
BY MR. SCHLENDER: Have you had a chance to review it?
"A.
Yes, I have.
"Q.
Now that you have looked at it, does it help to refresh your
memory?
"A.
You know, I think I do remember something from this Dr. Shuman,
but I probably just gave it directly to Dr. Cushman.
And do you recall what it was - reviewing that document, do you
"Q.
recall the subject matter as stated therein now?
"A.
I do. I do - Dr. Shuman, that what I remember, that name.
"Q.
Did you receive in your office, as best as you recall, the documents
that are mentioned in there?
"A.
You know, I would think so. And I would just stamp them

and put them on Dr. Cushman's desk. It's nothing that I read.
"Q.
"A.
"Q.
"A.

Because that is your E-mail?
Yes.
Is it not?
Yes
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:Q.
And then you would have, as best you recall, you gave
those documents to Dr. Cushman?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And do you recall, the documents you would have given
him, would they be the same ones as listed there on that E-mail?
"A. I would think so, if that's what I received.
"Q.
and you have no reason to believe you didn't receive that E-mail?
"A.
No. It was just so long ago I can't remember.
"Q.
What were the documents?
MR. HALL: Your Honor, I'm going to object to that as calling for
speculation. This witness, all she has is an E-mail.
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. If the witness has a present
memory that enables her to answer that question, she may do so. If she
doesn't have a present memory, she may refresh her recollection by
reviewing any number of things. Go ahead and ask away, Mr. Schlender.
MR. SCHLENDER: Thank you, Your Honor.
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: Do you have a present memory of what came
with the E-mail?
"A.
I don't. When it has to do with our patient and something else that
I'm not involved in, I just put it on Dr. Cushman's desk.
"Q.
Now, reviewing that document, and what it says was attached, what
was it you would have put on Dr. Cushman's desk?
MR. HALL: Your Honor, I still think it calls for speculation on the part of
this witness.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: Do you recall putting anything on Dr.
Cushman's desk?
"A.
I don't at this time.
"Q.
You don't have an independent recollection of it?

"A.
No, I don't.
MR. SCHLENDER: Your Honor, I offer that document to refresh her
memory.
THE COURT: Well, the witness has reviewed the document in order to
attempt to refresh her memory, and that document has either served the
purpose of refreshing her memory or it hasn't.
You may ask.
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: It has not refreshed your memory?
"A.
No, no.
"Q.
But you don't deny you received it?
"A.
I really can't remember.
"Q.
Other that what you have already testified?
"A.
Right, Right.
THE COURT: I'm not going to allow the document to go into evidence.
(TR. Vol.I, p. 903 L. 15 - p. 907, L.3)
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Bonnie Lee confirmed by her return E-mail (Exhibit 86) that Dr. Cushman had,
indeed read not only the e-mail but the attachments:
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: Now that you have looked at that, do you
remember that, sending me that E-mail?
"A.
I do. And what I put on here is exactly what Dr. Cushman told me how to respond "Q.
Told you how to respond?
"A.
-- or suggested to give the times that he was available.
"Q.
So before you sent that E-mail back to me, you talked with Dr.
Cushman?
"A.
Um-hmm.
"Q.
And what did you tell me with regard to Dr. Cushman?
"A.
What it says here on the E-mail.
"Q. And would you tell me what it says.
"A.
That he reviewed the information, and - when Dr. Shuman would
be calling, and which days Dr. Cushman was in surgery and be in the
office. And that if he needed any further information to contact me.
"Q:
Is that exactly what that says, what you wrote?
"A.
Do you want me to read it?
"Q. Yes.
MR. HALL: Your Honor, it's not in evidence yet.
THE COURT: I think there probably has now been a sufficient foundation
laid. I will allow the witness to - I'll allow you to move the admission of
that single document at this time, if you would like to Mr. Schlender; and
then and only then can she read from it.
MR. SCHLENDER: I would move for the admission of it.
THE COURT: Is there any objection to the admission of Plaintiffs Exhibit
-was it 87?
MR. SCHLENDER: 86.
THE COURT: 86.
MR. HALL: Your Honor, 86 includes 85, that you just denied admission
of.
THE COURT: Well, 85 is written by somebody other than this witness.
Correct?
MR. HALL. Correct.
THE COURT: That doesn't come in. 86 can come in, but you'll have to
excise the other E-mail.
(TR. Vol.I, p. 909 L. 9 - p 911, L.5.)

"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: Would you please read what you wrote back.
"A.
"Dr. Cushman reviewed all the information you sent and

has agreed to do this. Please let us know the date and time Dr.
Shuman will be calling.
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"Dr. Cushman is in surgery Tuesday, Wednesday, and Friday
mornings. He normally is not in on Mondays and some Thursday
mornings.
The best time would be on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday
afternoons. If you need any other information, please do not hesitate to
contact me.
"Q.
And when you say, he "has agreed to do this", are you referring to
something?
A. I would think it would be the talking with Dr. Shuman.
(TR. Vol.I, p. 911 L.14 - p. 912 L.5.) (emphasis added)
Dr. Cushman stated emphatically he had not seen the operative report, he had
not reviewed the Mayo Clinic records, nor Dr. Shuman's curriculum vitae.

His

secretary, Bonnie Lee, stated that she gave "those documents" to Dr. Cushman. Counsel
specifically asked her, "Now, reviewing that document and what it says was attached,
what was it you would have put on Dr. Cushman's desk?" The Court sustained an
objection to that question; the jury never did know that Dr. Cushman had, indeed, been
given the Thomson medical records, operative report and Dr. Shuman's CV, which
would have totally impeached Dr. Cushman's testimony that he had neither seen nor
reviewed them prior talking to Dr. Shuman about exactly the type of surgery described
in the operative report.
Wide latitude should have been allowed in cross-examination of these
important witnesses to show bias and to test the credibility of Cushman and his
secretary. State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 372 P.2d 748. The Idaho Rules of Evidence
reflect a heightened concern for a truth-seeking objective of a trial and substantially
broaden the challenge of the credibility of a witness. State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 752
P.2d 632; Morford v. Brown, 85 Idaho 480, 381 P.2d 45 (written statement of witness
not admitted but witness was cross-examined as to the contents of the written
statement).
This was a critical and pivotal point in the trial. Dr. Cushman had not been listed
as a witness, contrary to the pre-trial order of the Court. Once he denied advising
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plaintiffs expert witness as to the standard of care and that he had reviewed the medical
records of the case, the testimony of Dr. Shuman was damaged, to say the least.
Cushman's secretary testified that she had given Dr. Cushman the records; the court
refused to allow the jury to know what medical records and operative reports had been
given to Cushman to review prior to Shuman telephoning him. If the jury had known
they had discussed not a generalized standard of care for this operation but in fact the
exact medical records and surgery performed upon Thomson, the jury would have
known the truth: that Dr. Cushman was not telling the truth when he said he had not
received or reviewed those records; they could have then believed that Dr. Cushman was
not truthful when he said he did not discuss the standard of care for pericardial cyst
surgery with Dr. Shuman. This was a fundamental error and in and of itself mandates
that Thomson be allowed a new trial.

Categorizing Dr. Cushman as an impeachment

witness did not exempt him from disclosure prior to commencement of the trial.
Medical malpractice cases turn on the plaintiffs expert's ability to ascertain the local
standard of care from a generally hostile community of local doctors who do not
cooperate with plaintiffs' malpractice attorney. There is no public policy argument for
encouraging trial by surprise. Thomson could have found another doctor to discuss the
local standard of care with Dr. Shuman. This tactic increases the transactional cost of
litigation and encourages sandbagging; each party is required to hire more experts and
have those experts consult with more local doctors in order to guard against this tactic.
Finally, it encourages attorneys to "lay traps" for one another and have numerous
impeachment witnesses available. This case is an excellent example of that tactic and
problem; Thomson's counsel provided proof that the local doctor had indeed reviewed
the medical records of Thomson which he expressly denied. The trial court's refusal to
allow that impeachment testimony was devastating to plaintiffs case.
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IV.

EVIDENCE OF MR. THOMSON'S CONSENT TO THE OPERATION
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED
Thomson did not plead as a cause of action a lack of consent to the operation

undertaken by Dr. Olsen. Thomson filed a motion in limine requesting that Olsen's
counsel be barred from mentioning during the trial the consent form(s) signed by Mr.
Thomson or making any suggestion that consent had been given to the surgery since it
could be considered by the jury as consenting to negligence; this was the subject of a
motion in limine. (R. Vol. I, 00138). The Court denied that motion. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 8, L.
13 - p. 9, L.20).
The issue of informed consent is entirely separate from that of negligence and is a
separate cause of action to be both pled and proved during the trial. Foster v. Traul, 141
Idaho 890, 120 P.3d 278 (Idaho 2005). See, Idaho Code §39 - 4301 et seq; Sherwood v.

Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 805 P.2d 452 (1991). The actual consent form signed by Mr.
Thomson was offered by the defense and admitted into evidence.
"CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. HALL:
"Q. Good morning, Mr. Thomson.
"A. Good morning.
"Q. If at any time you have any difficulty breathing or any problem while
I'm examining you, please feel free to ask and we can always take a break
for you if that's necessary.
"A. Thank you.
"Q. I've had you handed an exhibit. It's Exhibit No. 105. It's entitled
Medical Center Consent for Surgery, Anesthesia, and Medical Diagnosis.
Do you have that document, sir?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And have you ever seen that document before?
"A. I believe so.
"Q. In fact, does that document reflect your signature?
"A. Yes, sir, it does.
"Q. And that reflects a date that a witness signed that of February 6th ,
2003?
"A. That's correct.
"Q. And it also shows that this is a document from St. Luke's Hospital?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And it was a document that you signed prior to the time that you had
your surgery done by Dr. Olsen. Correct?
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"A. I don't know that. Is there a time or something.
"Q. There's a 2-6-03 on there.
"A. That's the date of my surgery. But is there a time?
"Q. That's the date that the witness signed, witnessing your signature, on
February 6th, 2003, at 7:50.
"A. Okay, so that's the time. So in the morning of my surgery, yeah.
MR. HALL: Your Honor, we would offer Exhibit 105, being the consent
form signed by Mr. Thomson prior to the surgery that was performed by
Dr. Olsen. It relates specifically to that surgery.
"THE COURT: You had an objection. Correct, Mr. Schlender?
"MR. SCHLENDER: Yes, Your Honor. That consent regards the hospital.
This case isn't against the hospital. It has nothing to do with the hospital.
And that is the consent, when the court looks at it, it doesn't say anything
about Dr. Olsen.
"THE COURT: Well that goes to the weight, not the admissibility. I'll
overrule the objection. Defendant's Exhibit 105 is admitted.
(Exhibit 105 admitted).
(Tr, Vol. I, p.625, L.1 - p. 627, L.7.)
Defense counsel asked Dr. Olsen if Mr. Thomson had consented to the surgery:
"Q.
Was Mr. Thomson also - did he sign a consent form for this
surgery?
"A.
Hedid
"Q.
And that is Exhibit 105, I believe. In that, there's a statement made
where it refers to the fact that he is authorizing Olsen, Craig which I guess
is you "A.
Yes.
"Q.
-- to do a procedure on him, which it looks like it says - it's hard to
read. Can you read that?
"A.
"Left video-assisted thoracoscopic surgery, resection of
mediastinal/pericardial cyst".
"Q. That was the operation you were intending to perform?
"A.
That's the way I listed the operation when we scheduled it.
"Q. And it then says, "The need, the nature of the procedure, the
alternatives available, and the reasonable risks related to this procedure
were explained to me, to my full satisfaction, by the above-named and/or
designee." That would be referring to you.
Is it your testimony that you did explain the need, the nature of the
procedure, or the alternatives and the reasonable risks to Mr. Thomson
before he consented to his surgery?
"A.
Yes, I did.
"Q.
And it says, "No warranty or guarantee was made as to the result".
Is that a correct statement?
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"A.

That's correct.
"Q.
And it then goes on to say, "I authorize and direct the above-named
to arrange for additional services as deemed reasonable and necessary,
including the administration of anesthetics, radiological procedures, and
pathological services".
"A.
That's correct."
(TR. Vol. I, p. 771 L.9 - p. 772, L.23.)
If consent to an operation is not an issue, it is manifest error to allow counsel to make it

a centerpiece of the case. The consent form which was admitted into evidence and read
to the jury gave a clear inference that Mr. Thomson "assumed the risks" of the surgery to
which he consented and assumed the risk of negligence. Idaho does not have a case
directly on point. The closest case to examine the issue is Puckett v. Verska, 114 Idaho
161, 158 P.3a 937 (Idaho 2007). Therein the district court granted a motion in limine
and limited the cross-examination of Puckett who brought the suit on the issue of
informed consent. The district judge had indicated that there was no need to crossexamine Puckett because the evidence could be construed to mean that she assumed the
risk of surgery. The district court therein also took steps to remedy the testimony on the
issue of informed consent and issued a curative instruction. The court in Verska
reasoned that it was not reversible error where the witness made a statement contrary to
the motion in Iimine, received an admonishment, and the district court later issued a
curative instruction. That did not happen in this case. The district court in Verska
granted the motion to limit the examination of Puckett on informed consent; this Court
sustained granting the motion in limine on that issue. Thomson submits it should have
been granted in the instant case, particularly considering the clear implication that Mr.
Thomson assumed the risks of the surgery.
The concepts of medical negligence and lack of informed consent are separate
and distinct. Foster v. Traul, supra. The former involves the physician's duty to
perform competently at all times. The latter concerns a patient's right to be informed of
risks that cannot be avoided even through the best of care. As one Ohio Appellate Court
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recently made clear, "informed consent" is not a defense to a physician's failure to
render appropriate and competent medical services. Waller v. Aggarwal, 116 Ohio App.
3d 355 (Trurnbull Co. 1996).
As appellant correctly contends, the action brought against appellee
sounded in negligence. It did not sound in battery for a nonconsensual
procedure. Nor did appellant allege that she was not fully apprised of the
risks of the procedure. Instead, appellant alleged that appellee negligently
performed the procedure. The fact that appellee informed appellant that
injury to the bladder was a possible risk of the procedure could not be a
defense to the claim of negligence brought by appellant. Thus, the
admission of evidence pertaining to that issue and references to that issue
carried great potential for the confusion of the jury.
As a result, we hold that the references to informed consent made
during the trial constituted plain error, as they were both apparent on
their face and prejudicial.
*****

With regard to the jury interrogatory, it is clear that the language
employed demonstrates the confusion of the issues. The fact that
appellant consented to the procedure and was informed of its risks did not
result in a "waiver of her rights". It did not grant consent for the
procedure to be performed negligently, and it did not waive appellant's
right to recourse in the event the procedure was performed negligently.
116 Ohio App. At pp. 357-358.
Also, see Wright v. Kaye, 267 Va. 510, 593 S.E.2d 307 (2004), which held as follows:
"... we held that where a lack of informed consent is not in issue in a
medical malpractice case, evidence of information given to the patient
concerning the risks of surgery is irrelevant to the sole issue in the case:
Whether the physician departed from the standard of care. We observed
that such evidence 'could only serve to confuse the jury because the jury
could conclude ... that consent to the surgery was tantamount to consent
to the injury'." Id. at 528-29, 593 S.E.2d at 317.
The plaintiff did not plead and did not pursue a claim of lack of informed consent
regarding removal of the pericardia! cyst. The claim was that the phrenic nerve was
damaged during the operative procedure. Therefore, the testimony and documentary
evidence pertaining to that issue was totally irrelevant; counsel's questions implied to
the jury that Mr. Thomson had assumed the risk of the surgery. Assumption of risk is
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not a defense, even assuming a patient could consent to malpractice. The Idaho cases
have never so held. Admitting into evidence the consent forms and counsel's crossexamination was clearly prejudicial to Thomson.

v.
VI.

"KNOWN COMPLICATION" DEFENSE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
EXCLUDED FROM EVIDENCE
Plaintiff filed a motion in limine on November 21, 2006, two weeks prior to

commencement of the trial, requesting that the Court rule as follows:
"Defense counsel and witnesses should not be allowed to make any
reference in any manner to damage to the phrenic nerve being a "known
complication" of Dr. Olsen's surgery until an adequate medical foundation
is provided with support for that proposition and argument which
otherwise, is mere argument and barred by "Daubert" as interpreted by
the Idaho decisions."
The court denied that motion, stating as follows:
"MR. SCHLENDER: Thank you, Your Honor. The second one was that
the court had denied our motion in limine regarding the use by the defense
of what is known as, quote, the known complication, closed quotes,
defense.
"THE COURT: What I said was that your suggestion, Mr. Schlender, was
that or your request was that the court order the defendants to avoid any
mention of quote, unquote known complications of a particular surgery.
I denied that motion as well. Obviously with the comment that if an
expert witness is asked to opine about complications that are common or
known in this type of surgery, that assuming there's an adequate
foundation laid for that testimony, that I would allow that testimony. But
it's difficult sometimes to rule on these objections in a vacuum. So I'll
have to see how it plays out.
But to the extent that your motion was rather broadly seeking just a
black-and-white order saying "no mention of known complications,·· that
one was denied."
(Tr. Vol. I, p.9, L.21 -p.10, L.18.)
Following the court's ruling, the foundational "known complication" defense had to be
explored with Dr. Shuman, plaintiffs medical expert:
"Q. Doctor, now I want to turn to the subject about risks of surgeries.

First off, did you do a study or a review of literature with respect to what
would be considered complications or known complications of pericardia!
cyst surgeries?
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"A. Yes.
"Q. And in doing this specific search, what you did, I want to ask you a
few preliminary questions.
First, what - are there medical textbooks that are produced for
physicians and medical students?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And do you read those in medical school?
"A. Yes, you do. And afterwards.
"Q. I gather you are taught from textbooks?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And the other materials that you see, from the time you're in medical
school and through your residence, there are also some textbooks?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And there are also what are called medical journals?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Tell the jury how it comes about - first off, how many specialties are
there of medicine?
"A. Hundreds of them, maybe even more than hundreds.
"Q. And are there journals produced by various organizations for each
specialty?
"A. Yes.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 310. L.2 -- p.311, L.10
"Q. Let me ask you a couple questions. First, do you consider the Atlas of
Thoracoscopic Surgery to be authoritative?
"A. Yes ....
"Q. And in the practice of medicine as you do, as you practice medicine,
would this be a treatise that you would consider as authoritative, and
something that would assist thoracic surgeons in treating their patients?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Okay, go ahead with what you were going to say, Doctor.
"A. Well, in that they have chapters on different types of approaches as to
what type of operation you could do. They talk about the anesthetic, how
you put the patient to sleep, because you have to collapse one lung to see
the opposite lung.
But then they have Chapter 5 is "Complications".
"Q. Complications of what?
"A. Complications of video-assisted thoracic surgery, a VATS procedure,
which was done in this case.
"Q. Would this be what are called known complications?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Okay, go ahead. I'm sorry.
"A. It's the only place that I've been able to get a list of, "known
complications of VATS procedures". And he lists "Q. Is there a table? Let me ask you this: Is there a table of those?
"A. Yes.
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"Q. Where it just simply lists what all of the known complications are?
"A. Yes.
Tr. Vol.I, p 314, L.10 - p. 315, L.24.
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: Now, looking at Plaintiffs Exhibit 46, what
the jury has before them. Now, this came - this table comes from what
chapter in the Atlas?
"A. This is Chapter 5 which is "Complications" in the Atlas of
Thoracoscopic Surgery.
"Q. And it lists them, does it not?
"A. Yes.
"Q. I wonder if you would tell the jury, when they're looking at this table,
what each of these potential complications are, in terms that we can
understand.
"A. Right. Number one is hypoxemia, which is low oxygen....
Number two is mediastinal compression ....
Number three, CO2 embolism tension pneumothorax.
Number four, extrapleural trocar placement ....
Number five is lung injury. ...
Number six, trocar damage to the intercostals bundle.
Seven is parenchymal. That's the lung tissue itself, hemorrhage and
air leak. ...
Eight is pneumothorax. ...
Arrythmia [sic] is number nine ... .
Number ten, low blood pressure ... .
Eleven, hypercarbia. .. .
Twelve is pain. .. .
Three [sic], atelectasis ....
Equipment malfunction. ...
And things break. ...
Five, are infections ....
And then finally, ventilator dependence.

So basically what they've got is, Dr. Mack has got 16 intraoperative
complications that occur with exactly the operation that was done by Dr.
Olsen. And there isn't any mention of phrenic nerve damage because it's
so easy to visualize the phrenic nerve, and everyone knows that it's there,
that you - even though it may be in the location of where that cyst could
be, although in this case it didn't seem that it was, you know that by and
large you're always going to be able to identify it, see it and preserve it.
So that's why it is not on this list: Because it is not a
known complication. It is a complication that can occur only
because it's in that geographic area of the chest. But it
shouldn't occur in normal cases.
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There are some instances where it can occur: In cancer surgery,
horrible infections, radiation therapy, where you're going in second or
third operation on the chest, where everything is so scarred. You can
damage it under those circumstances, and no one would be critical of that.
But on a first go-around, in this instance, it should have been wel1
visualized.
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 320, L. 12-p. 328, L.22.) (emphasis added)
With this testimony, plaintiff established a lack offoundation for testimony that
damage to the phrenic nerve during cyst removal surgery was, as per learned treatises, a
known risk or complication of the surgery.
Defense counsel asked his expert witness, Dr. Wood, if damage to the phrenic
nerve during this surgery was a "known complication":
"Q.

As a part of that, there have been discussion [sic] in this case as to

whether or not injury to the phrenic nerve is a known complication of
surgery or the surgery in this case.
Do you have any opinions with regard to whether or not that - it is
a known complication, or it is not a known complication?"
"A.
Phrenic nerve injury is definitely a known complication of
operations - any operations that occur in the vicinity of the phrenic nerve.
(TR. Vol. I, p. 970, LB)
Plaintiff's counsel asked that the answer be struck, which was overruled. (TR. Vol.I, p.
970, L. 19--22).
Dr. Wood could not cite one authoritative treatise, textbook or article which
supported his statement that phrenic nerve injury during a pericardia! cyst removal is a
known complication of the procedure. Excerpts of Wood's testimony are as fol1ow:
That isn't my question. My question is, of course - and I'm going to
show you; we'll get to that. But my question is that phrenic nerve injury
during a pericardia! cyst procedure, VATS procedure, is a known
complication of that procedure?
"A.
Yes, it is a known complication. Every thoracic surgeon would
acknowledge it.
"Q.
Tel1 me the name of the journal and the article that says that.
"A.
The Annals of Thoracic Surgery, an article by Dr. Rene Jancovici."
(TR., Vol. I, p. 1028, L. 13-24.)
"Q.
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... "Q. Doctor, in the one you're talking about, the article you talk about,

do you agree that it is a relatively authoritative treatise, the Annals of
Thoracic Surgery?
"A.
No, I don't think authoritative is a good descriptor of any medical
literature. I don't think our science is exact enough to be considered
authoritative.
"Q. Well, how - is the article that you quoted from, do you consider it to
be an article that is accurate?
"A.
Yes. I think it's a very reasonable article.
"Q. And it was called, "Complications of Video-Assisted Thoracic
Surgery, a five-year experience." Correct?
"A.
Yes.
"Q. And in that particular article, the damage to the perinea} nerve, and
I'll hand it to you if you want to look at it. Nowhere in this article does it
say it's a known complication of all pericardia} cyst surgeries, does it,
Doctor?
"MR. HALL: Your Honor, I think he misspoke. He said perinea] nerve; I
think you mean phrenic nerve.
MR. SCHLENDER: If I did, phrenic nerve, you bet. I'm sorry.
THE WITNESS: It's phrenic, not perineal. And there's nowhere,
there's not a sentence that says it, to the language that you're
describing, no. Not in that article.
(TR. Vol. I, p. 1029 L.20-p. 1030, L.25.)
... Q. Doctor, that wasn't my question. My question was, can you point us
to a textbook or article, other than what we've talked about, that says that
it is a known complication of pericardia} cyst removal, VATS, that the
phrenic nerve is damaged? Can you point to one?
A.
"Q.
"A.

Yes.
Which one?
There's a number of articles. Can I have the pack that I brought?
"Q.
We'll get to go through these, Doctor, carefully. I'm going to have
the whole pack in.
"A.
I would like all of that.
(TR. Vol. I. p.1036, L.5-18)

"Q.
Doctor, the doctors that wrote these articles, are they learned
doctors?
"A.
I presume so, yes.
"Q.
Do you think when they write these, they know what they're putting
down, what they're saying?
"A.
Yes.
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"Q
Anywhere in this article, does it say a risk of this surgery
for pericardia! cysts is damage to the phrenic nerve? That's the
question, Doctor. Yes or no?
"A.
It does not say that in those words.
"Q.
Let's pull out your next one.
"A.
The next one is Video-Assisted Thoracoscopic Thymectomy for
Myasthenia Gravis. That's Internal Medicine Journal 2002. And in this,
they had 26 patients, one of whom had an injury to the phrenic nerve.
"Q.
Could I see that please, Doctor. I don't happen to have that one.
"A.
Yes.
"Q.
And the thymectomy is not a pericardia] cyst surgery, is it?
"A.
It is not. It is in exactly the same location as pericardia] cyst
surgery, however.
"Q. The thymus is exactly in the same place as a pericardia] cyst?
"A.
Where this pericardia] cyst was, yes.
"Q. Yes, and on this one it says there was a diathermy injury. Correct?
"A.
Correct.
"Q. And that means what?
"A.
That means that the cautery that was used resulted in an injury to
the nerve.
"Q.
And in fact, in this one it says recovered. Right?
1

'A.
"Q.

Yes.

"A.

Yes.

Does this say anywhere in this article, does this say
anywhere in here, does it say that it is a known risk or
complication of pericardia! cyst removal, that the phrenic nerve
was going to be damaged? Does it say that?
"A.
It does not."
(TR. Vol.I, p. 1041 L. 21 - p. 1043 L.14) (emphasis added)
... "Q. Doctor, the question to you was that it is a known complication. It
can happen absent of negligence. Do you remember Mr. Hall asking you
that?
"Q.
And this doesn't - does this article say it can happen in the absence
of negligence, Doctor?
"A.
It's unusual that physicians write in their scientific articles about
negligence. So I would presume that this injury was not related to
negligence. There's nothing to suggest that it was.
"Q. And there's nothing to suggest that it wasn't is there?
"A.
No. We don't have the details of that single case. But the case
certainly exists.
"Q. Next.
"A.
The next one is an article by Uchiyama in the Annals of Thoracic
Surgery called Infrasternal Mediastina Scopic Thymectomy and
Myasthenia Gravis Surgical Results in 23 Patients.
And this series also had a phrenic nerve injury in one patient.
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"Q.

May I see it, please, Doctor.
(Document handed to Mr. Schlender)
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: It says in this particular one, this is a
thymectomy again, is it not?
"A.
Y:es, I"t.IS.
"Q. This is complete removal of the thymic gland. Right?
"A.
Correct.
(TR. Vol. I, p. 1047 L.15 - p. 1048 L. 22)
... "Q.Doctor, in all of the surgeries of cardiothoracic surgery, what does
that cover? Cardiothoracic surgery covers surgery and what areas of the
human body? Start enumerating them for us.
"A.
It's surgery in the chest, which includes the heart, mediastinum,
airway, lung, esophagus and chest wall.
"Q. And the mediastinum is divided into various areas, is it not?
"A.
Yes, it is.
"Q. And each one has peculiar organs in it or structures in it, does it
not?
"A.

Yes.

"Q. And the lungs are certainly - surgery on the lungs is a whole area
itself of surgery, is it not?
"A.
It's a part of cardiothoracic surgery, yes.
"Q. And in all of those surgeries on all of the parts that you've talked
about, the incidence of a phrenic nerve having any problems is 1.4, is it
not?
"A.
That's correct.
"Q.
Incidentally, in this particular one article, this says nothing about
pericardia! cyst, does it?
"A.
No.
"Q.
And it doesn't say a known complication of removing a
pericardia! cyst is damage to the phrenic nerve, does it?
"A.
It does not say that.
(TR., Vol. I, p. 1052 L.9 - p. 1053 L.15.)
... "Q. But you agree with me, mammary vessel harvest is not operating on
pericardia! cysts, is it, Doctor?
"A.
It is not, no.
"Q.
Now, in that, you say there are 53 injuries. I want to read to you the
next sentence. "There was no phrenic nerve injury in noncoronary surgery
or coronary surgery using conduits other than the internal mammary
artery." Isn't that what it says?
"A.
Yes.
"Q.
2,084 patients?
"A.
2,084 patients with 53 injuries.
"Q.
It says there was no phrenic nerve injury in noncoronary
surgery. Isn't that what it says, Doctor?
(TR. Vol.I, p. 1056 L.9 - p. 1057 L. 3.) (emphasis added)
"A. Yes.
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The next one is quite different, but I think is relevant. And it's an
article by a surgeon named Akata, A-k-a-t-a.
It's called
Hemidiaphragmatic Paralysis Following Subclavian Vein Catheterization,
published in 1997. This is a case report that's relevant because this is just
from sticking a needle into a blood vessel in the vicinity of the phrenic
nerve that resulted in complete paralysis to demonstrate that phrenic
nerve paralysis can occur in very minor areas of trama.
"Q. Can we see the article itself? Could I see it please?
"A.
I have the abstract. I don't have the whole article for you.
(Document handed to Mr. Schlender.)
"Q. Subclavian vein catheterization, is that removal of the pericardia!
cyst?
"A.
That is not removal of the pericardia} cyst.
"Q.
By the way, that doesn't say damage to the phrenic nerve
is a known complication of pericardia} cyst surgery, does it,
Doctor?
"A.
It does not.
(TR. Vol. I, p. 1058 L. 7 - p. 1058, L.6.) (emphasis added)
... "Q. That's all right. In any event, have you ever testified in front of a
jury in a case and said that the phrenic nerve is destroyed as a known
complication ofpericardial cyst surgery?
"A.
I don't think I've testified in a pericardial cyst case before, no.
"Q.
Never?
"A.
Not that I recall, no.
"Q.
Doctor, I have your CV here, and it is indeed thick and impressive.
But let me ask you this question.
Of all the things in here, have you ever written that a
known complication of pericardia} cyst surgery is destroying the
phrenic nerve?
"A. Not that I recall, no."
(TR. Vol. I, p. 1063 L. 6-21.)(emphasis added)
"A.

Dr. Wood could not point to one article, treatise or textbook which supported his
bold conclusion that injury to the phrenic nerve during this surgery is a "known
complication".

If there was any question that the "known complication" defense was pivotal to
this case we need only consider the following closing argument to the jury by defense
counsel:
(MR. HALL) "What was the issue in the case? Well, the issue is pretty
simple. It's whether the phrenic nerve was injured because Dr. Olsen's
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care fell below the standard of care. And we have offered proof in this case
as to what happened to the phrenic nerve and as to how it happened.
Mr. Schlender said make them prove it. Well, we proved it. We
have proved that the phrenic nerve injury is a known risk of this
surgery. We have proved it through Dr. Olsen who testified that
in his training, it was a known risk of surgery.
We proved it through Dr. Wood, who came into this court and told
you that if he had a person who was a resident, somebody trying to become
a board certified resident, a board certified doctor, and he was asked the
question of whether or not phrenic nerve injury is a known risk of surgery
for a pericardia} cyst, and that person told him no, he said he would flunk
that person. That's how clear, that's how basic, that's how important that
concept really is.
And the witnesses who testified, Dr. Olsen, Dr. Wood, Dr.
Orme, Dr. Symmonds, Dr. Lee, and the literature all establish
that principle.
I think probably one of the more interesting moments of the trial
was when Mr. Schlender was trying to argue with Dr. Woods about what
the literature said or didn't say. And you'll remember that Dr. Woods
would say well, I found this article. It says the phrenic nerve is basically a
(TR. Vol. I, p. 1241 L. 7 - p. 1242 L.14.)(Emphasis added)
known risk."
There was no foundation provided the other defense witnesses that injury to the
phrenic nerve was a known risk of this procedure. For instance, consider the testimony
of Dr. Olsen, the defendant:
"Q.
Now, you heard Dr. Shuman testify that, as to the issue of whether
or not injury to the phrenic nerve could be a known risk of this procedure.
Do you have an opinion as to whether injury to the phrenic nerve
would be a known risk of this procedure?
"A.
Yes, I do.
"Q.
And what is that opinion?
"A.
Anytime you're operating near the phrenic nerve "MR. SCHLENDER: Objection, Your Honor. He asked about this
procedure, not "anywhere near the phrenic nerve".
"THE COURT: Overruled.
"Q.
BY MR. HALL: Go ahead.
"A.
I knew I was going to be operating near the phrenic nerve, within
perhaps even millimeters of it. And so yes, there was most definitely a risk
of injury to the phrenic nerve.
(TR. Vol. I, p. 768 L.13 - p. 767 L. 7.)
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Dr. Orme who assisted in the surgery chimed in adding his observation without
foundation that damage to the phrenic nerve was a known risk:
Now, as an assistant surgeon involved in this type of surgery, were
you aware of any known risk or complications with respect to the type of
surgery being performed on Mr. Thomson?
"MR. SCHLENDER: Objection. Limited to being an assistant, not the
surgeon.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. The witness may answer the
question.
THE WITNESS: Yes, I was aware.
"Q. BY MR. HALL: What risks were you aware of?
"A.
Well, in a surgery like this, there's always the risk of bleeding from
the entry wounds into the chest wall. There's the risk of infection
occurring in the pleural space, the space between the lung and the chest
wall. And there would be a risk of an air leak from the lung, and there
could be a risk of nerve injury.
"Q.
What nerve"
"A.
The phrenic nerve particularly.
"Q.
And why is that a risk?
"A.
Because of its course in the chest. It travels from the neck down
along the carotid artery and over the arch of the aorta, and then runs along
the pericardium, the covering of the heart. And it runs from along the
pericardium down to the diaphragm.
And so this phrenic nerve is in a region where the cyst was in this
case, so it could be something that one would look out for."
(TR. Vol. I, p. 792 L.9 - p. 793, .113.)
"Q.

Dr. Symmonds, another defense expert witness, covered the same ground:
Do you have an opinion as to whether or not, in the performance of
a thoracoscopic mediastinal procedure, the phrenic nerve would constitute
a known or common risk of the procedure?
"A.
Especially with a cyst in this position, the phrenic nerve is
immediately adjacent to that cyst, and it is at risk, yes.
"Q.
And you're referring to this specific procedure?
"A.
Yes.
"Q.
It that a risk that you would explain to the patient if you were going
to be doing the surgery?
"A.
I would."
(TR. Vol. I, p. 825 L.19 - p. 826, L. 8.)
"Q.

In the expert witness disclosure for Dr. Wood, it was stated that he would testify
damage to the phrenic nerve during various surgeries is a known complication of the
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surgery; that the phrenic nerve can cease to function or be damaged absent any
negligence on the part of the doctor; that it is a "known risk" of pericardia] cyst surgery.
None of this was true. No medical textbook, medical journal or treatise supported such
speculation.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 has been construed by our Supreme Court to require
that expert testimony meet a modified criteria of Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In determining whether or not expert
testimony should be allowed, various factors are to be considered; whether or not the
theory or technique in question can be tested, whether it has been subject to peer review
in publication, its known or potential error rate, the existence and maintenance of
standards governing its use and whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within
a relevant scientific community. The overarching subject of the inquiry is "the scientific
validity - and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability - of the principles that
underlay the proposed submission." State v. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29, 909 P.2d 647
(1996); Walker v. American Cyanamid Company, 130 Idaho 824, 948 P.2d 1123 (1977);
Idaho v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 310, 3 P.3d 535 (Idaho Ap. 2000).
It has been commonly stated that the trial court is charged with the role of being
a "gate keeper" and must initially determine whether the expert is proposing to testify to
scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in
issue. The physician's use of traditional medical technology is important in determining
whether or not to allow a physician's testimony. Joiner v. G.E., 78 F.3d 531-32. The
expert's reliance on "anecdotal" evidence as opposed to "imperial" findings decreases
the reliability of the evidence. Muzzey v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 921 F. Supp. at 519;
Allen v. Pennsylvania Engineering Corp., 102 F.3d 194. The expert's testimony will be
particularly suspect when the expert has not conducted any independent research
outside of the litigation on the subject matter of the expert's testimony. Experts should
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be rejected whose conclusions have failed to be tested and which have not been subiect
to scientific scrutiny. Rogers v. Ford Motor Company, 952 F. Supp. at 606.
An unexplained conflict with a generally accepted scientific theory can be the

basis for exclusion of medical expert testimony. Turpin v. Merrill Dow Pharms., 959
F.2d. 1349; O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Company, 807 F. Supp. 1378; Conde v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 804 F. Supp. 972.
Where an expert's testimony is contradicted by the general level of current
medical knowledge, the court will abuse this discretion in admitting that expert's
testimony. Black v. Food Lion, 171 F.3d 308 (Fifth Circuit 1999).
Prior to the testimony of Dr. Wood or any other expert witness by the defense,
the Court should have required that the defense make an offer of proof outside the
presence of the jury, providing the Court with medical evidence that damage to the
phrenic nerve during pericardial cyst surgery is a known complication. Absent such a
foundation, the testimony should have been barred.
Although this Court has not adopted the strict standards for admissibility of
scientific or other expert witness as set forth in Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2788 (1993), certain elements of Daubert
have been adopted. For instance, whether a theory of defense has been subjected to
peer review and publication has been applied even if the theory is not commonly agreed
upon or generally accepted. Idaho v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 962 P.2d 1026 (1998).
When an expert's opinion is based upon scientific knowledge, there must be likewise a
scientific basis for that opinion; and if the reasoning or methodology underlying that
opinion is not scientifically sound, then the opinion will not assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or determine a fact at issue. Swallow v. Emergency Medicine
of Idaho, 138 Idaho 589, 67 P.3d 68 (2003). There was a total lack of foundation laid
with the defense witnesses who testified that damage to the phrenic nerve during
pericardia! cyst surgery is a "known risk" of that surgery. A "known risk" is exactly that:
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one which is recognized, taught and discussed in peer reviewed literature, textbooks and
articles. For example, in addition to the trial testimony already quoted, we find the
following in the testimony of Dr. Symmonds, one of the defense medical expert
witnesses:
"Q:
... If the phrenic nerve was stretched, pulled, banged on, or burnt
with ultrasound, do you think those are in the standard of care?
"A.
I think the standard of care is to try to avoid doing any of those
things to the phrenic nerve.
"Q: And aside of those that you mentioned, you also said sometimes
there may be no explanation. Right?
"A.
Right.
"Q.
And in this particular case, in removing a pericardial cyst using
VATS, and the jury knows that that is, I believe you said sometimes it just
happens without knowing why. Right?
"A.
Correct.
"Q. What are abstracts?
"A.
They're synopsis [sic] of articles.
"Q.
Did you learn from textbooks how to practice medicine, partially?
"A.
Sure.
"Q.
Do you learn - do physicians, where they have run into a problem
or a complication, is it in the practice of medicine customary that these
physicians will write a paper or an abstract on that situation and have it
published so that other doctors can read that, so that they don't make the
same mistake?
"A.
That's how we get a lot of our information.
"Q.
That's how medicine works, is it not? In other words, medicine
works historically. Correct?
"MR. HALL: Your Honor, object to the form of the question as
compounded.
"THE COURT: Sustained.
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: Does medicine work historically, Doctor?
"A.
Medicine works by physicians and patients trying to deal with their
problems, working together I guess. The physicians learn from history by
studying what has transpired, what other physicians have experienced,
and basing your practice on other people's experience is only appropriate.
"Q.
And there are hundreds, if not thousands, of medical journals
published wherein doctors such as yourself and others may write articles,
abstracts on problems that have arisen in surgeries or procedures.
Correct?
"A.

Yes.

"Q.

And does your group subscribe to some of those?
Sure.

"A.
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What are some of the ones you subscribed to?
"A.
The Journal of Vascular Surgery. I read Journal of Thoracic and
Cardiovascular Surgery, Annals of Thoracic Surgery. We get numerous
weekly journals that come in the mail even without subscribing to them.
We get newspapers, newsletters that come out on a weekly basis.
"Q.
And you have had - I don't believe Mr. Hall asked you this, but
about what time were you asked to work on this case?
"A.
Several months ago. Initially I reviewed the records as a
preliminary thing, and only in the last month did I get this large box of
depositions that have been taken recently.
"Q. You took the time to go through all of those?
"A.
I went through most of them, I guess.
"Q. And hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of medical records.
Right?
"A.
It would probably end up being a thousand.
"Q.
In your practice, you have access, to [sic] you not, through
computers, the Internet, as well as medical universities, I should say
universities and schools of medicine, you have access to textbooks of
medicine literally around the world, do you not?
"A.
Yes.
"Q.
And you can pull up, if you need to, either you or someone in your
office can reach databases of literally thousands and thousands of
abstracts, to try to find something you're interested in. Correct?
"A.
Yes.
"Q.
Between the time you were asked to assist on this case, as you sit
here now before the jury, can you tell the jury, did you find or do you know
of one abstract, one textbook, one journal, which says that damage to the
phrenic nerve during pericardia! cyst surgery, being done by VATS, just
that the damage occurs for just some unknown reason?
"A.
I'm not aware that's written anywhere.
"MR. SCHLENDER: Thank you, Doctor."
(TR. Vol.I, p.841 L.14 - p. 845 L.15.) (Emphasis added)
"Q.

Dr. Orme, who assisted at the surgery, denied having a learned or scientific basis
for his statements regarding "known risk" of the surgery:
"Q. How many phrenic nerve/pericardia! cyst combination, in other
words where you're next to the phrenic nerve, you're removing a
pericardia! cyst and you're using the VAT system, how many of those had
you personally done prior to the time of Mr. Thomson's surgery?
"A.
I don't recall that I had done any, that I had performed "Q.
Do you have present knowledge that Mr. Thomson was aware that
the assistant in this operation had never done one of these operations
before?
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"A.
No, but - no, I've been involved in hundreds of operations on the
pericardium and around the phrenic nerve, as has Dr. Olsen.
"Q. Now, getting back to this risk involved. Are you telling the jury that
the risk of damaging that phrenic nerve in a pericardia! cyst surgery, using
video-assisted thoracoscopic surgical instruments, that the risk of that
surgery is such that it is a known complication?
"A.
I don't know of reports linking pericardia! cysts with paralysis of the
phrenic nerve, but"Q. Excuse me just a minute. Let me ask you the questions.
MR. HALL: Your Honor, could he let him finish the answer?
MR. SCHLENDER: I thought he answered it.
THE COURT: Well, ask your next question, Counsel.
"Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: Doctor, as a matter of fact, you don't
know of one textbook that says that, do you?
"A. I don't, but I know a lot about phrenic nerve injury "Q. Doctor "A. -- and I don't need to cite a text to tell you that.
"Q. I'm talking about a pericardia! cyst removal. Okay? On a
pericardia! cyst removal, using video-assisted thoracoscopic
surgery instruments, can you cite to the jury one single article,
or one single journal, or one single textbook in the history of
medicine that supports that statement. Yes or no?
"A. I cannot, but I have not specifically looked for this either.
"Q. Thank you, Doctor."
(TR. Vol.I, p.812 L.3-p. 814, L.2.)(Emphasis added)
This Court in Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 153 P.3d
1180, reversed a ruling that plaintiffs expert witness Dr. Smith in a brain damage case
was unqualified as an expert to testify as to the cause of the brain damage. Dr. Smith
had based his opinion not only upon experience but upon his research. As this Court
noted in its opinion, "He provided many articles as a basis for his opinion .. .. While
there is no exact known effect of the combination of chemicals infused into Evelyn's
brain, there is scientifically reliable evidence regarding the effect of increased
intracranial pressure.

Dr. Smith based a portion of his opinion, dealing with the

mechanical effect of the increased amount of fluid in Evelyn's brain, upon such
scientifically reliable information."

The Court recognized that there are rare

occurrences where there is not scholarly research but that would only pertain to where
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there is "otherwise scientifically valid testimony". Such facts do not exist in this case;
this is not a question of differential diagnosis but whether or not there was medically
sound evidence based upon known medicine, that damage to the phrenic nerve is a
"known risk" of pericardial cyst surgery.
There was no factual basis for the opinions of the experts that damage to the
phrenic nerve was a known risk of the surgery; not one of them testified that they had
had a similar situation arise during such surgery. There must be some factual basis for
the opinion of an expert when an expert expresses a purely personal opinion. Oats v.
Nissan Motor Corporation in the U.SA., 126 Idaho 162, 879 P.2d 1095 (1994).

CONCLUSION

As much as in any case tried to a jury, a medical malpractice case requires that
both the trial court and counsel run a tight ship. The medical malpractice case reaches
into the heart and mind in a profound manner; physicians are held in high esteem in our
society, for good reason. If there is to be a just resolution of the medical case, a level
playing field is required. An error by the trial court in the admission of evidence which
would be harmless in the context of garden-variety litigation can be pivotal in a medical
trial, particularly since the credibility of the plaintiff is being constantly weighed by the
jury against that of the physician and his finely-tuned expert witnesses. The physician
does not need an evidentiary advantage.
Ever since the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1958, they have
been liberally construed with a just result as the ultimate goal to be accomplished. Sines
v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 435, 566 P.2d 758 (1977). Substantial prejudice inevitably occurs

when a key witness is not disclosed as occurred with Dr. Cushman; the error was
compounded by disallowing counsel to vigorously cross-examine him. Plaintiffs must
be given the opportunity and rebut the defendant physician's evidence in a medical case.
Edmunds u. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006).
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Absent extraordinary circumstances, the written consent of a patient provides for
the jury conclusive proof that the patient has assumed the risks of surgery and the
physician is absolved from liability.
medical malpractice litigation.

The Consent to Surgery form is the centerpiece of

Counsel for the doctor hammers home with cross-

examination of the patient that the written consent form signed by the plaintiff takes the
issue of personal responsibility out of speculation and provides a solid foundation for
the doctor to proceed with the operation, knowing that an educated patient cannot
thereafter be heard to complain if the surgery produces a bad result. Conversely, if the
patient concedes that he has been given written explanation and warnings as to the risks
of the surgery to which he consents, the focus of the evidence should be on whether or
not the surgical procedure was negligently performed; at least under Idaho law, there is
no balancing between a surgeon's negligence and the patient "assuming the risk".
Considering that Thomson did not plead a cause of action of lack of consent for the
procedure, no evidence was required to prove facts not in issue. While a learned judge
. may know that the patient does not customarily consent to a negligently performed
operation, the subtle nuances of the weight of evidence are not appreciated by a jury and
hence the rule of law that the court must exclude from the trial issues that are unfairly
and unduly prejudicial unless there is an overriding reason for their admission. In this
case, clearly there was not such a need to admit into evidence Mr. Thomson's written
consent to the operation.
Not one of Dr. Olsen's expert witnesses testified that they had personal
knowledge and experience of the phrenic nerve being damaged during pericardia! cyst
surgery. They all simply repeated the mantra prompted by leading questions that
damage to the phrenic nerve was a "known complication". Dr. Wood attempted to
buttress his opinion with reference to learned texts, treatises and periodicals on the
subject of pericardia! cyst removal with damage to the phrenic nerve. However, on
cross-examination it was conclusively established that not one of the articles that he
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referenced nor any of the others utilized by Dr. Shuman provided any historical or
scientific knowledge that damage to the nerve during this particular surgery was a
known risk or complication. This Court has adopted the standard of a medical theory
being tested by whether or not it has been subjected to peer review and publication.

State v. Merwyn, 131 Idaho 642, 962 P.2d 1026 (1998). This case is the exact opposite
of Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, supra, wherein the expert Dr. Smith based
his opinion upon his experience and research; the court allowed the testimony since Dr.
Smith "provided many articles as a basis for his opinion".
This Court approved the logic of the 9th Circuit as expressed in Clausen v. M/V

New Carissa, 339 Fed.3d 1049 (2003), holding that a trial court was justified in
excluding the expert's testimony if the expert fails to offer an explanation why an
alternative cause is ruled out. Applying that logic to the instant case demonstrates
precisely why the known complication defense should have been excluded. Dr. Wood
speculated that there was no treatise, textbook or scientific report of damages to the
_ phrenic nerve during pericardial cyst surgery because pericardia} cyst surgery is the
same as any other thoracic surgery. (TR. Vol. I, Pp. 1067-1069) That position was
rejected by all of the medical articles reviewed with Dr. Wood during cross-examination,
as well as by the medical textbook examples cited by Dr. Shuman. Surgery to remove a
pericardial cyst by definition was not heart or lung surgery, which is the most often
visited domain of thoracic surgeons. All of the textbooks and articles that were cited to
Dr. Wood during his cross-examination stated exactly the opposite: that damage to the
phrenic nerve during pericardial cyst surgery could and should be avoided.
Dr. Wood summarized the total lack of foundation for his opinions in the
following exchange:
"Q. By Mr. Schlender: Doctor, you were asked about Ken in this case and

the standard of care had been complied with. Right?
"A. Yes.
"Q. So he just, what, had bad luck?
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"A. It appears that way, yes."

(TR, Vol. I, p. 1074 L.14-20)

Bad luck is not normally equated with sound medical and scientific principles. Reliance
on such conjecture highlights why the "known complication" defense should never have
been allowed.
For all of the above stated reasons, it is respectfully requested that the Order
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S11b,ject: Telephone conversation with Dr. Shuman
From: Lee Schlender <loeschlenc1er@qwest.11et>
Date: Tt1e, 01 Nov 2005 11 :56:27 -0700
To: "bonnie L. /Dr.Cushman" <bom1iel@cableone.net>

Bonnie:
I have attached the Operative Report, the Mayo Clinic Report and the C,V. of
Dr. Shuman.
Dr. Cushman would potentially talk by telephone with Dr.Shuman regarding
the surgical case; Dr.Cushman will not be an expert for any side and will not
be called to testify.
Dr. Shuman simply needs t:o talk with Dr.Cushman and see what ha t:hinks of the
phrenic nerve compromise that caused the paralyzed diaghram in this unfortunate
fellow,
I will forward ,:o you any required retainer or you can bill me after they talk;
whatever you prefer.
If Dr.Cushman can do this, I will have Dr.Shuman· give him
the next couple of weeks.

a call;

p:robably in

You can just email me back.
Many Thanks !
Lee
Erv L. Schlende:r,J.D.
Medical-Legal Specialist
2700 Holly Lynn Drive
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
ph: 208-567-1999
fax: 206-587-0992
leeschlender@gwest.net
www.medico1esi:al-speciali$t.org
--i:l'CfSr.1:1:t Ce:rtified,American Board of Prof.Responsibility (1999)

National Board of Trial Advocacy, (1980)
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Subject: RE: Teleiihone conversation with Di-. Shuman
I?rom; "Bonnie Lee" <bonniel@cableone.net>
Dnte: Wed, 2 Nov 2005 08:06:42 -0700
To: leeschlender@qwest.net

Di:. Cushman reviewed all the information you sent and has ag:,:eed to do
this. Please let us know the date and time Dr.. Shuman will be calling.
Dr. Cushman is in surgery Tuesday, Wednesday and Friday mornings. He
normally is not in on Mondays and some Thursday mornings. The best time
would be on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday afternoons. If you need any
other information, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Bonnie
-----Original Message----From: Lee Schlender (mailto:leeschlender@gwest.net]
Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2005 11:56 l\M
To: bonnie L. /Dr.Cushman
Subject: Telephone conversation with Dr. Shuman
Bonnie:

I have attached the Operative Report, the Mayo Clinic Report and the

c.v, of Dr.Shuman.

Dr. Cushman would potentially talk by telephone with Dr.Shuman regarding
the surgical case; Dr.Cushman will not be an expert for any side and
will not be called to testify.
Dr. Shuman simply needs to talk with Dr.Cushman and see what he thinks
of the phrenic nerve compromise that caused the paralyzed diaghram in
this unfortunate fellow.
I will forward to you any required retainer or you can bill me after
they talk; whatever you prefer.

If Dr.Cushman can do this, I will have Dr.Shuman give him a call;
probably in the next couple of weeks.
You can just email me back.
Many Thanks !
Lee
Erv L. Schlender,J.D.
Medical-Legal Specialist
2700 Holly Lynn Drive
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
ph: 208-587-1999
fax: 208-567-0992
leeschlender@9:!es.:t:net
~.Jll!l.Slicolega~~specialist.orq
Board Certified,ll:merican Board of Prof.Responsibility (1999)
National Board of Trial Advocacy. (1980)
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